A Survey on LLM Watermarking: Theory and Deployment

arXiv:2607.10103v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly embedded in high-impact workflows, yet their ability to generate fluent text at scale has amplified risks of provenance ambiguity, model misuse, and large-scale content laundering. LLM watermarking, embedding invisible signatures into model outputs, has emerged as a promising technical layer for attribution, auditing, and downstream trust decisions. However, the literature has grown rapidly and unevenly: existing categorizations often mix orthogonal design choices, making it difficult to compare methods, reason about guarantees, or translate research results into deployable systems. This survey provides a systematic, deployment-oriented review of LLM watermarking. We organize the space by the core questions practitioners must answer: where a watermark is embedded (generation-time vs. training-time, token vs. representation), who can detect it (public vs. private detection authority), what is assumed (access to logits, sampling control, secret keys, model ownership), and which threat models are targeted (paraphrasing, translation, summarization, style transfer, token manipulation, and adaptive removal). We synthesize the main families of techniques-including sampling biasing, code-based schemes, representation- and training-based approaches-and analyze their security-utility trade-offs through the lens of detectability, robustness, and distribution shift. We further review attack and evasion strategies, evaluation protocols and metrics (false positive control, calibration, robustness curves), and open challenges such as cross-model transfer, multi-modal pipelines, collusion, and governance constraints. Finally, we provide practical guidance for selecting watermark designs under real operational requirements and identify research directions needed for reliable, accountable LLM deployment.